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Abstract 
In this essay, we trace the symbolic conundrums of belonging, and of the reconciliation of 
identities, in the context of Catalan and Scottish sport and politics. Our discussion will 
commence with a necessarily concise consideration of past academic contentions regarding 
the national ‘psyches’ which have been argued to shape contemporary notions of identity and 
politics in Catalonia and Scotland, before turning our attention to the specific role of sport 
vis-à-vis these ‘psyches’ and the growing clamour for greater political autonomy for each of 
these stateless nations. Based on evidence drawn from the interaction between sport and 
politics in the two nations, we argue that secessionism is a liminal field of transformation as it 
includes what is seen as mutually exclusive sets of relationships (Catalans vs. Spaniards; 
Scottish vs. British, secessionists vs. unionists/centralists), which at the same time allows 
subjects to pass from one state to another and occupy them non-exclusively. 
Keywords: Sport; nationalism; secessionism; Catalonia; Scotland 
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 Introduction 
 The aim of this paper is to examine the intersection between sports and the respective 
secessionist movements in Scotland and Catalonia. In the case of the former, organised sport 
has played a significant role in helping to maintain Scotland’s separate identity on the global 
stage despite being an integral part of the United Kingdom nation state with both the Scottish 
Football Association (SFA) and the Scottish Rugby Union (SRU) being formed in 1879. In 
Catalonia, sport also achieved the status of national symbol with the resurgence of nationalist 
sentiments in the late nineteenth century coinciding with the foundation of Football Club 
Barcelona in 1899. Ironically, however, previous comparative studies of Scotland and 
Catalonia have tended to focus on other issues not least language. Despite commencing with 
some consideration of that work, this paper primarily seeks to fill a vacuum by developing a 
comparative analysis of nationalism in the two nations that is centred on sport with reference 
to the concept of duality as expressed through the Catalan concepts of Seny and Rauxa and 
the Caledonian Antisyzgy. Discussion of nationalism in Scotland and Catalonia is followed 
by separate analysis of the relationship between sport and nationalism in each, followed by a 
conclusion which brings together the various strands of the paper. 
In 1980, the second issue of the short-lived Bulletin of Scottish Politics published two 
documents under the heading ‘A Nation without a State, a People without a Language’ 
(Llobera, 1980). The nation in question was not Scotland, although the first of these two 
descriptions could at least have been readily shared at the time. The nation was Catalonia 
which, in more recent times, has been discussed in relation to Scotland far more often than 
was the case in 1980. Josep Llobera’s (1980: 168) main concern was that one year after the 
signing of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, the future of the Catalan language had become 
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‘far more precarious and disquieting’ than in the darkest days of Francoism. Llobera’s 
commitment to the language was at the time unremitting to the extent that it was reported to 
the author by several Chilean refugees living in Hull, England, in the mid-1970s that he 
forced them to speak to him in very hesitant English rather than converse with him in Spanish. 
In reality, however, only in a political rhetorical sense were the Catalans in 1980 ‘a 
People without a Language’. Officially they had two languages - Catalan and Castilian - 
although this is not to dismiss the ongoing struggle for supremacy of one over the other.  
Indeed, it has been widely argued that sustained promotion of the Catalan language in both a 
written and oral form has remained a pivotal cultural marker which distinguishes Catalonia 
from the unitary Spanish state, with the Catalan language widely used by Catalan civil 
institutions and the Catalan education system, resulting in a high proportion (c. 90%) of 
Catalan residents claiming an ability to understand the language in a written or oral form 
(Duerr, 2015; Guibernau, 2014; Ordeix and Ginesta, 2014).  Invoking Edensor (2002), this 
‘everyday’ marker of Catalan identity thus illustrates the important role of civil society 
institutions in terms of maintaining a sense of distinction for stateless nations within unitary 
states. 
For its part, Scotland had three languages – English (the overwhelming first language 
of a majority of the population), Gaelic (the first language of a relatively small number of 
people living mainly in the western highlands and islands) and Lallans (a literary language in 
written form but also the basis of the language of everyday life for many English speakers). 
In Scotland’s case, however, language was far less politicised than in Catalonia even though 
Gaelic has been regularly called upon to attest to the distinctiveness of the nation. 
If language was not a major issue in Scotland in 1980, however, like Catalonia, the 
Scottish nation was undeniably stateless.  On 1st March 1979, the Scottish people had voted 
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on the British government’s proposals for an elected assembly in Scotland, a nation which 
had given up its independence prior to the age of mass democracy and, since 1707, had 
existed politically within the context of the United Kingdom. For some, however, the 
referendum gave Scots the opportunity to resume some part of their ancient autonomy and 
rights and the proposals were accepted.  The 1979 referendum saw a ‘Yes’ vote of 51.6% 
against a ‘No’ vote of 48.4%, on a turnout of 63.8%; this meant only 32.85% of the electorate 
being in favour of a Scottish Assembly, with 30.78% against, and 36.37% who did not vote at 
all (Harvie, 1998; Ichijo, 2004; Leith and Soule, 2011).  Given that this failed to reach the 40% 
threshold set by the UK government through its acceptance of the ‘Cunningham Amendment’ 
(Harvie, 1998), the Scotland Act was repealed despite achieving a majority in favour in the 
referendum.  To claim, however, that a degree of long-lost autonomy would have been 
introduced as a consequence of the vote was to ignore the extent to which Scotland had 
enjoyed a considerable amount of autonomy even while locked within the constitutional 
arrangements of the UK (Paterson, 1994).  
The various pillars of this national autonomy that are customarily invoked include 
distinctive legal, educational and local government systems and Presbyterianism, rather than 
Episcopalianism, as the national form of worship, in the institutional form of the Church of 
Scotland. Influential as the latter was from the Reformation onwards, however, by the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century another, at least as significant, pillar had been added to the 
edifice of Scottish autonomy in the shape of organised sport. With institutions such as the 
SFA and the SRU in place, international sporting competition could begin, initially between 
Scotland and England alone and soon after embracing both Ireland and Wales.   
In Catalonia, sport also achieved the status of national symbol. The resurgence of 
nationalist sentiments in the late nineteenth century coincided with the foundation of Football 
Club Barcelona. The Catalan nationalist elite was quick to adopt the new game, including 
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such emblematic presidents like Josep Sunyol, who was shot by Francoist forces in 1936 for 
his Republican and Catalanist ideas of citizenship, which he closely associated with sport. 
Jordi Pujol, the first president of the post-Franco Catalan government said this about 
football`s role under the repressive Franco regime (1939-75): ‘Barça is like other folkloric 
manifestations of our people—a reserve we can draw on when other sources dry out, when 
the doors of normality are closed to us’ (in Burns, 2012: 245). More recently, the traditional 
sport of human tower building has become a particularly iconic encapsulation of secessionist 
sentiments (Vaczi, 2016). 
Sport therefore can be argued to act as an important signifier of autonomy for stateless 
nations such as Catalonia and Scotland (Boyle, 2000; Boyle and Haynes, 1996; Garcia, 2012; 
Iorweth, Hardman and Rhys Jones, 2014; McFarland, 2013; Nili, 2009; Vaczi, 2015).  Given 
this, the forthcoming discussion compares the extent to which sport has played a role in the 
recent growth of support for political autonomy in both contexts.  Whilst the political, 
cultural and legal contexts in which the recent respective plebiscites on Catalan and Scottish 
independence have differed, as has the role of sport within these contexts, we will argue the 
existence of both parallels and disjunctures regarding the nexus between sport and the ‘nation’ 
is highly instructive for understanding the impact of sport within contemporary political 
nationalism. 
In 2010, the Spanish Constitutional Court rejected the Catalan Government`s proposal 
for a new Statute of Autonomy arguing, among other things, that it was unconstitutional 
because it referred to Catalonia as a ‘nation.’ The Constitution does not recognize any nation 
other than the Spanish and allows regions to refer to themselves only as ‘nationalities.’ It was 
this rejection of their nationhood that first drove massive numbers of Catalans to the streets in 
2010 to claim independence under the banner ‘We are a nation. We decide.’ Our point of 
departure is to explore the conditions of statelessness or ‘nationless-ness’ through the 
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ambiguous subjectivities that emerge through sport in secessionist contexts. There is a sense 
in which the secessionist subject is, to borrow from psychoanalysis, a ‘split subject’ or, even 
more revealingly, a ‘barred subject’ (Parker 2003): divorced from its object of desire (state- 
and/or nationhood), it is always thwarted by the existence of contradictory attitudes side by 
side, and the impossibility of ‘wholeness’ as the subject is ‘barred’ from full presence, self-
identity, or self-consciousness. It is a state marked by transitoriness and ambiguity as the 
‘threshold subject,’ a motif borrowed largely from Dostoevsky. The stateless subject, we 
show here, emerges in the fissures of dislocations, inhabits ‘double spaces’ (Seitz 2017), and 
suffers some ‘double binds’ (Bateson 1973). 
We aim to capture these complexities as we trace the symbolic conundrums of 
belonging, and of the reconciliation of identities, in the context of Catalan and Scottish sport 
and politics. Our discussion will commence with a necessarily concise consideration of past 
academic contentions regarding the national ‘psyches’ which have been argued to shape 
contemporary notions of identity and politics in Catalonia and Scotland, before turning 
attention to the specific role of sport vis-à-vis these ‘psyches’ and the growing clamour for 
greater political autonomy for each of these stateless nations. Identifying and unpacking the 
sport world`s positions and impasses in secessionist contexts will help us understand 
secessionist subjectivities as both incomplete and over-determined at the same time, as 
contested sites where, with the words of Scottish poet Hugh MacDiarmid, ‘extremes meet.’ 
 
Politics and the ‘psyche’ of two stateless nations 
Between the ‘common sense’ and ‘madness’ of Catalan politics 
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It is not uncommon for cultures to organize their moral universe around binaries, 
which would surface in morality tales, everyday conversations, oral tradition, and even sport. 
In his seminal essay on the Balinese cockfights, Clifford Geertz describes the event as an 
enactment of a primordial duality where ‘man and beast, good and evil, ego and id, the 
creative power of aroused masculinity and the destructive power of loosened animality fuse 
in a bloody drama of hatred, cruelty, violence, and death’ (Geertz 1973: 420-421). The 
Mexican lucha libre acts out moral qualities through its ‘good guys’ (técnicos), and ‘bad guys’ 
(rudos) (Levi 1997: 63). In the Basque game of pelota, the binary ethos of morality vs. 
immorality is manifested through the noble, clean game of the back-court player ‘lion’ 
contrasted with the mischievous, cunning game of the front-court player ‘fox’ (González 
Abrisketa 2012). For Catalans, the way things get done ranges between the two extremes of 
seny ‘common sense,’ and rauxa ‘madness.’ Seny is considered as the culturally salient and 
desirable psychosocial disposition (Ferrater i Mora, 1944). Everything can be done with seny, 
even things that are paradigmatically about losing control, such as drinking at festivals 
(Noyes 2003, 136).  
In politics, a particular manifestation of Catalan seny is pactisme, a strategy of 
consensus that has its roots in Medieval political culture as a collaborative, rather than 
confrontational, relationship between the king and the urban ruling class (Desfor Edles 1999). 
Catalan pactisme stands in contrast with what Zulaika calls the Basque ‘no-saying culture’ 
(1988: 300): a defiant attitude stereotypically attributed to what is seen in Spain as rebellious 
Basques who veto, boycott, walk out or fight, while Catalans embrace a consensus. In 1975, 
after the death of Franco, Spain embarked on its democratic Transition, and ETA`s campaign 
intensified in the Basque Country. Catalonia, in turn, did not just go along with the building 
of a new Spanish state, but in fact emerged as one of its driving forces. ‘Core Catalan 
nationalist symbols,’ Desfor Edles writes, ‘especially democracy, Europeanism, pactisme and 
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seny, not only meshed nicely with transitional themes of modernity, reconciliation, and the 
politics of consensus—but they helped define these themes’ (1999: 39). A manifestation of a 
common vision was that 90% of Catalan voters said ‘yes’ to the Spanish Constitution drafted 
in 1978.  
Catalonia’s shift toward the idea of independence resulted from a series of political, 
social and cultural developments in Spain and, like in case of Scotland, pro-independence 
feelings intensified when dealing with the conservative central government of the Partido 
Popular (People’s Party). Increasing state-region antagonism is due, on the one hand, to the 
hard line conservative position with regards to regional concessions in comparison with left-
wing central governments; on the other hand, the leftist strain in pro-independence positions 
in Catalonia has been historically dominant. In 2003 a left-wing Catalonian government 
started to push for greater financial autonomy and a reform of the Statute of Autonomy. What 
ensued was two Spanish rejections of Catalan propositions for a new fiscal arrangement in 
2005 and 2010. While pro-Spain actors may reduce the independence movement to Catalans` 
pursuit of a new financial plan, and thus highlight their disdained stereotype as capitalist 
moneymakers (Brandes 1990), the shift from the desire for greater financial autonomy toward 
independence had important symbolic triggers. 
Catalonia has held a series of minor or major referendums since 2009, but the Spanish 
government has been staunchly rejecting the officialdom of all of these referendums. 
Eventually overcoming its internal left-right divisions, the Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes) 
coalition of the CD, ERC, and civil organizations won 62 of the 135 seats in the 2015 
regional elections. Although the coalition had promised a unilateral declaration of 
independence in case of victory, it had subsequently discarded it because, as in case of 
Scotland, the ‘Yes’ vote (48%) fell short of the desired mandate of at least 50% of voters. 
Instead, the new pro-independence Catalan government decided to hold a referendum in 
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October 2017. The Spanish government declared it illegal, citing Article II of the 
Constitution, which establishes that Spain is one and indivisible. Spain-Catalonia relations 
plummeted on voting day in October 2017 as the Spanish police shut down voting centres, 
confiscated ballot boxes, and forcibly prevented people from voting, resulting in 800-plus 
civilian injuries. Leading politicians and cultural figures of the independence movement went 
into exile in Europe, and Catalonia`s statute of autonomy was suspended. Recent political 
developments in Spain and Catalonia have ranged from tragic through melodramatic to 
absurd: governmental standby, repeated elections, temporary governments, police brutality 
and political imprisonment, independence declaration and its suspension 40 seconds later 
indeed created a climate of ‘madness’ where no one really knows what happens next.  
From a conservative centralist perspective, Catalonia`s current independence 
movement has been seen as a political shift from ‘common sense’ to ‘madness.’ With a shift 
from pactisme to independentisme, pro-Spain actors generously implied that Catalans took a 
holiday from their superego seny by pointing out a divorce from their cultural character. 
Spain president Mariano Rajoy watched the 2014 non-binding referendum from his office, 
and expressed his wish that by Monday, Catalonia ‘recovers its seny.’ Pro-Spain parties 
campaigned under the banner of ‘common sense’, the ‘Platform for Seny’ was founded, and 
the pro-independence efforts were routinely described as ‘irrational folly,’ ‘madness’ and 
‘fantasy.’ In 2015 the leading Spanish daily El País published an op-ed article titled ‘Tribute 
to the Basque seny’ (El País 2015), which compared the ‘constructive and cordial’ (currently 
non-independentist) Basque government with the ‘terrible and hardly intelligent’ Catalan one. 
Who would have thought, the article questioned, that the much-praised seny, this Catalan 
word that evokes common sense and deliberation, would abandon the politics of its natural 
habitat and settle, of all places, in the Basque Country? By alienating Catalan political 
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subjects from their culturally endorsed trait, political discourse effectively hystericized 
secessionist subjectivities.  
 
‘Head’, ‘heart’ and the ‘Caledonian antisyzgy’ in Scottish politics 
The condition of living in a stateless nation but surrounded by institutional reminders of 
partial autonomy has resulted in a belief amongst most Scots that ‘Scotland is distinctively 
ours, to be defended against encroachments from outside (Paterson, 1994: 1).  It has also led, 
however, to a conflicted understanding of what it means to be Scottish, and how Scottishness 
and Britishness can be reconciled, if at all.  For intellectuals, this conflict has on occasion 
produced extreme reactions.  When Scottish poet, Hugh MacDiarmid wrote in 1926, ‘I’ll ha’e 
nae hauf way hoose, but aye be whaur extremes meet’ (‘I’ll have no half way house, but 
always be where extremes meet’) (MacDiarmid, 2008), he could easily have been referring to 
the internal conflicts that can take over people’s lives as characterised by the Scottish novelist, 
Robert Louis Stevenson (2012) in his Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. This 
preoccupation in Scottish literature with the conflicted personality has been captured in the 
concept of the Caledonian antisyzygy, as understood by Gregory Smith (1919), 
in the very combination of opposites – what either of the two St Thomases, of 
Norwich and Cromarty, might have been willing to call “the Caledonian antisyzygy” 
– we have a reflection of the contrasts which the Scot shows at every turn, in his (sic) 
political and ecclesiastical history, in his polemical restlessness, in his adaptability, 
which is another way of saying that he has made allowance for new conditions, in his 
practical judgement, which is his admission that two sides of the matter have been 
considered (Smith, 1919: 4). 
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Even more relevant perhaps are the following words of the Scottish-born polymath, Patrick 
Geddes,  
Here we are divided between two exaggerations – one, that of a legendary superiority 
in almost every conceivable respect to almost all conceivable people; the other of 
excessive self-deprecation, as if we had no nationality worth the name (cited in 
Macdonald, 2009: 152).  
Initially a literary concept, the ‘Caledonian antiszygy’ has served as a means by which to 
understand the Scottish intelligentsia’s reaction to the Scotland’s loss of statehood and 
absorption into a united polity in 1707. On the one hand, there was a retreat into 
antiquarianism and a quest for solace in the nation’s romantic past. On the other hand, there 
were those who forged the Scottish Enlightenment and sought to be more modern, to write 
better English and, in some cases, to be better Britons than their counterparts south of the 
border (Daiches, 1952). For most Scots, however, even those most closely associated with the 
eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment, the loss of statehood has meant living in that 
liminal space between those extremes and concomitantly between Scottishness and 
Britishness. To the end of his life David Hume was concerned about his Scottish accent and, 
although Adam Smith had acquired the spoken and written English of the English during six 
years of study at the University of Oxford, like Hume he was very much a product of his 
native country with its poverty, its superior universities, its learned societies and ‘its 
internalized sense of inferiority’ (Crehan, 2016: 92). 
Indeed, Nairn’s (1977) arguments on the existence of ‘Caledonian Antisyzgy’ 
suggests that many Scots can thus reject the claims of political nationalist movements seeking 
to achieve Scottish independence, whilst maintaining a cultural identification with a distinct 
Scottish nation; such arguments thus epitomise the ‘head’ versus ‘heart’ debate which has 
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been argued to underpin the Scottish constitutional debate and the nature of Scottish national 
identities.  For Pittock (2012: 14), the aforementioned preservation of Scottish civic 
institutions is of great importance for the ideas of sovereignty and identity in Scotland, given 
that ‘from the beginning the union abolished and preserved Scottish sovereignty, and is to 
that degree a paradoxical as well as ambivalent document’. Although this incorporating 
approach to Scottish civic institutions can also be argued to have been replicated in the 
Catalan context through the Statutes of Autonomy afforded to Catalonia within the Spanish 
constitution, historical and recent developments in each context regarding political 
secessionist movements illustrate that the British government has continued to adopt a more 
conciliatory approach to such claims in comparison to that of the Spanish state. 
For example, as the issue of Scottish autonomy has gradually grown in prominence 
within Scottish and British politics since the late 19th century, UK-wide political and 
governing institutions have attempted to at least partially accommodate such claims.  This is 
evident in the gradual legislation for enhanced devolved power to Scotland from the 
Westminster Parliament, with the historical failures of the Scottish ‘home rule’ legislative 
bills in the 1910s supplanted by the establishment of the Scottish Office in Edinburgh in 1937, 
replicated later when the unsuccessful devolution campaign of 1979 was ultimately addressed 
through the successful (re)establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 (Devine, 1999; 
Harvie, 1998).  These developments were at least in part a response to growing public 
sentiment regarding the existence of a Scottish ‘democratic deficit’ whereby the preferences 
of the Scottish electorate sat at odds with the UK as a whole, most notably during the period 
of the Conservative government from 1979 to 1997 which saw the arrival of ‘Thatcherism’, 
ushering in economic and social policies which had considerable implications for Scottish 
society.  A number of commentators have highlighted the lasting impact of Thatcherism in 
manifesting a sense of a political divide between Scotland and England (Hearn, 2014; 
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Lecours, 2012; Leith and Soule, 2011).  Indeed, McCrone (1992: 93) argued that it is 
“difficult to envisage a political ideology more at odds with Scottish sensibilities and identity 
than that which has emanated from the South during the 1980s”. 
Furthermore, the contrasting conciliatory approach of the Conservative-led coalition 
Westminster government to the demands for a public referendum on Scottish independence 
by the Scottish government led by the nationalist Scottish National Party differs starkly from 
the approach of the Spanish state to the Generalitat de Catalunya. The result of the 2011 
Scottish Parliament elections placed the SNP in a position to hold an independence 
referendum, with its 69 MSPs providing the party with an overall majority. At the 2011 
elections, the SNP was able to exploit dissatisfaction with the Labour government following 
the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, and the return of the Scottish ‘democratic deficit’ at 
Westminster with the establishment of the coalition between the Conservatives and the 
Liberal Democrats following the 2010 general election (Mycock, 2012).   The SNP was able 
to form a majority government even though it only received 45.4% in the constituency vote 
and 44.0% in the list vote (SPICe, 2011), and despite the AMS electoral system which has 
been argued to have been designed to avoid such an eventuality (Harvie, 1998; Johns et al., 
2013). The negotiations with the coalition Westminster government resulted in the signing of 
the ‘Edinburgh Agreement’ in October 2012 which legislated for a single-question 
referendum before the end of 2014, in line with the SNP’s preference for a referendum date 
in autumn 2014.  
Whilst the ‘Edinburgh Agreement’ ruled out the proposal for a second question in the 
referendum for further devolution powers, despite the popularity of such an option during the 
‘National Conversation’ public consultation (Scottish Government, 2009), the close-run 
nature of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum led to further concessions from unionist 
parties regarding further devolution to the Scottish Parliament in the form of ‘The Vow’ 
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(Daily Record, 2014), a late intervention which has argued to have been to have helped to 
secure the eventual ‘No’ vote to Scottish independence.  Indeed, it can be argued that ‘The 
Vow’ in many ways illustrates the continued influence of the ‘Caledonian Antisyzgy’ in 
contemporary Scottish politics, with the accommodation of both the ‘heart’ and the ‘head’ of 
undecided voters who were deemed to have swung the balance in the favour of the pro-union 
campaign. 
 
Sport in Catalonia: Between the global and the local 
FC Barcelona is a football club where extremes meet in terms of local and global identities. It 
is més que un club, ‘more than a club’ as a symbol of catalanitat, and un equip que uneix el 
món, ‘a team that unites the world,’ as the controversial Qatar Airlines endorsement goes. 
Barça is by far the most recognizable Catalan brand in the word, while many global fans 
simply see it as a Spanish club. The club has crafted an international façade that is 
sufficiently neutral not to distract from sport performance and consumption.  
At the same time, club membership and its electoral census ensures that real 
management stays in Catalan hands. To be a member, one has to have at least a second-
degree family relationship to someone who is already a member, which creates a sense of 
primordial connectedness that goes beyond symbolic kinship. Moreover, to be able to vote, 
one should be resident of Catalonia not by decree but by sheer practicality, for this most 
global of clubs offers no online or mailing voting options. Members have to physically show 
up to vote under the tents outside of Camp Nou, in the Mediterranean summer heat. Below 
and beyond the club`s global reach, voting rights and practices are discreetly contingent on 
Catalonian rootedness. 
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It is hard to over-estimate the importance of voting for the perpetuation of a direct 
participatory spirit where club members may easily feel disenfranchised by politics and 
globalization. The desire to vote in politics has been historically linked to voting in sport. 
Under Franco, voting for presidents was banned in football clubs, because it ‘would have 
given the opportunity for an uncomfortable comparison with the lack of democracy in the 
national order’ (Shaw 1987: 122). FC Barcelona, however, found furtive ways to exercise the 
act of voting on minor affairs uncontrolled by the regime, which helped maintain a spirit of 
democracy. Today, the town hall meetings that presidential candidates hold during their 
campaign offer a scene rarely accommodated by global, multi-billion sport businesses. Fans 
of all ages and social strata challenge the candidates, some of the most powerful socio-
economic agents, businessmen, media moguls or lawyers of the country. In July 2015, 
candidate Josep Maria Bartomeu`s town hall meeting exuded the familiarity of a small village 
council, where practical questions were discussed about travel arrangements, ticket re-sales, 
players` behaviour, or the accommodation of fans with disabilities. The questions and 
comments ranged from poignant to slightly surreal, with much cheering and laughter. If only 
for the duration of the campaign, and at the level of fantasy as sceptics would add, club 
members feel empowered in the operations of their club.  
Because it has to balance its local and global identities, Barça`s political position is 
rarely expressed directly. ‘Barça doesn`t have to say anything about where it stands,’ Catalan 
fans will tell you. ‘We know.’ The club`s support constitutes a tacit understanding that lives 
in the minds and hearts of locals, as it did throughout the Franco regime. An instance of a 
complicit wink took place at the 2016 el Clásico against Real Madrid, when the terraces of 
Camp Nou displayed an unlikely mosaic formation: the shape of a human tower or castell. 
Human tower building is a two-hundred-year old traditional sport from rural Catalonia, which 
is lately booming as, among other things, a site of neighbourhood solidarity and Catalan 
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independentism (Vaczi 2016). What went unnoticed for the four hundred million television 
spectators of the Clásico worldwide was a gesture of identification with catalanisme through 
a traditional sport associated with the working classes and rural culture. The gesture revealed 
the ‘double spaces’ of Catalan secessionism through a modern sport standing for right wing 
bourgeois catalanitat, and a traditional sport standing for left wing working class 
Republicanism.  
 
Every athlete’s dream? Between the Spanish and the Catalan National Teams 
The romance of an obscure rural sport`s appropriation of nation building from a global giant 
lasts until we are reminded, for example by the New York Times, of football`s unchallenged 
ability to disseminate political messages worldwide. ‘Anticipating Anthem Protests, Spain 
Braces for ‘Verbal Violence,’’ the Times wrote in April 2018 (Keh 2018). The Spanish Copa 
del Rey King`s Cup has always represented Spain`s central powers, and finals involving 
regions such as the Basque and Catalan both reflect and generate centre-periphery 
antagonisms (Vaczi 2018). The first notable football whistling goes back to 1925 in 
Barcelona, to the regime of Primo de Rivera, who had just overthrown the constitutional 
government with a military coup. The event had major political repercussions: the stadium 
was shut down, and the President of FC Barcelona was exiled from Spain. The Les Corts 
stadium would be re-opened only after 12 religious practitioners blessed it in order to 
exorcise the ‘malevolent separatist spirits’ that had contaminated in (Burns 2011: 124). The 
recent tradition of contemporary whistling emerged across three cup finals (2009, 2012, 2015) 
between FC Barcelona and the Basque Athletic Bilbao, which some centralists sought to 
illegalize (Vaczi 2018).  
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Another site of contestation concerns national teams. Unlike in the UK, the Spanish 
federations do not allow for the officialdom of regional national teams; regional teams are 
only allowed to play unofficial friendlies against each other at Christmas, which fans properly 
consider inconsequential. This produces a conundrum that is proper to secessionist contexts 
only: athletes represent states with which they might not identify, and who may feel 
uncomfortable with the symbolic persona imposed upon them. ‘It`s been too long that they`ve 
been pressuring us with a sentiment that is not ours’ (Marca 2017) Nuria Picas, Catalan ultra-
trail world champion said about what psychoanalysis would call their ‘hysterical deadlock’ 
resulting from alienated desire (Žižek, 2006: 38-39). In patriarchal society, for example, an 
instance of a woman`s alienated desire is when a man imposes his expectations on her, and 
she wants what her big Other, man wants her to want. The players` double bind is that 
whatever they do, they will be punished. If they refuse to represent the state, they harm their 
careers as athletes. If they choose to represent the state, they jeopardize their personal 
integrity, and disappoint their local fans with whom they actually share a sub-national 
identity. The double bind has a third injunction, which stipulates that one cannot exit the field 
(Bateson 1973). In Spain, this corresponds to the Federation`s right to withdraw a player`s 
license if they refuse to play for the national team, effectively keeping them in the field.  
‘Nacho`s dilemma’ was an apt title of a 1995 El País article to capture sub-national 
players when facing the invitation to the Spanish national football team. Nacho Fernández, 
from Galicia, rejected that it was ‘every athlete`s dream to play for his country.’ Instead, he 
was ‘neither interested, nor thrilled’ about the possibility of playing for Spain. His rejection 
cost him a year of suspension. Two emblematic Basque players of the 1970s and 80s, Inaxio 
Kortabarria and José Ángel Iríbar also rejected playing for Spain. ‘For me, there was a 
moment of contradiction,’ Iríbar said in an interview in 1980. ‘I could no longer ask for the 
amnesty of Basque ETA prisoners, and then be ambassador of Spain with the Spanish 
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national team’ (Gómez 2007: 66). More recently, before the 2006 World Cup, the Catalan 
Barcelona defender Oleguer Presas explained to coach Luis Aragonés ‘how he saw the world,’ 
and told him that ‘when there is no sufficient commitment or sentiment, it is better that other 
persons go’ (Marca 2012). His comments generated a lot of controversy, and he lost some of 
his endorsements. 
Another secessionist athlete subjectivity is the one who chooses to prioritize their 
career and play for Spain in spite of their privately held nationalist convictions. ‘I played for 
Spain 158 times,’ former basketball player Jordi Villacampa said, ‘and I don`t regret it. Now, 
am I Catalan? Yes. Would I like to vote? Also. And I would vote yes [for independence]’ 
(Marca 2017).  There is also the approach mastered by Barcelona defender Gerard Piqué, who 
artfully obfuscates his position by flaunting his catalanisme publicly at pro-independence 
rallies, campaigning for the referendum, supporting the release of Catalan political prisoners,  
playing for Spain, and denying he favours independence (AS 2017). Piqué transcends and 
even mocks the binary agonies of the split subject. When questioned whether he ‘gave it all’ 
for Spain, he insisted that his position ‘[was] not incongruent,’ and while ‘it was not his case,’ 
he believed that ‘an independentist could play in the Spanish national team because there is 
no Catalan national team, and an independentist has nothing against Spain,’ and might even 
find Spain ‘a great country’ of ‘great people’ (AS 2017). Piqué feeds into the deepest 
anxieties of centralists about an anti-Spain player sabotaging the national team from within, a 
spectre that appeared each time the Spanish national team underperformed at international 
games. 
Not that the possibility of playing for Catalonia or the Basque Country in an official 
regional team would eliminate double binds. There is a sense in which the ban on regional 
national teams might be a relief for players who, below and beyond their political views, 
actually want to play for the prestigious Spanish national team. When for example Fernando 
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Llorente from Athletic Bilbao signed a petition for a Basque national team, centralists 
suspected ETA-related nationalist coercion, because Llorente always referred to playing for 
Spain as ‘a dream come true.’ ‘How is it possible,’ a commentator wrote, ‘that a twenty-
three-year-old man signs a petition that goes against his dream?’ (ForoGraciasAznar 2008). 
In a climate of intensifying regional nationalisms, it is quite unthinkable that a player, given 
the option, could choose to play for Spain rather than Team Catalonia or Basque Country 
without a backlash from his local fan community. There must be therefore players who are 
secretly grateful for the Spanish Federation`s ban: they can take refuge in that that they act 
out of necessity to protect their license, and play for Spain in the absence of a regional team.  
 
Catalan sport for Yes 
‘Although they won`t say it,’ London 2012 Olympic swimmer Claudia Dasca said, 
‘80% of the sport world wants independence’ (Marca 2017). Catalan athletes and clubs have 
been vocal about independence, and federations have been preparing for post-independence 
transformation for years. Among elite athletes and coaches who have campaigned for ‘yes’ 
besides the ones mentioned before are football coach Pep Guardiola, the basketball player 
brothers Pau and Marc Gasol, cyclist Anna Ramírez, footballers Marc Crosas, Oriol Rosell, 
or Ángel Rangel, to mention a few. Pep Guardiola was the most well-known face of the 
yellow-ribbon campaign, which cost him a 20,000-pound-punishment from the Football 
Association, for wearing a political symbol during Premier League games. Several elite sport 
clubs, including FC Barcelona, have joined in social media to ‘reject the crushing of rights 
and liberties and the self-government of Catalonia [and to] support any initiative that helps us 
vote at the [October 2017] Referendum’ (Públic 2017). 
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From an institutional perspective, the Olympic Committee of Catalonia (Comité 
Olímpic de Catalunya COC) was established to work toward the international recognition of 
Catalan athletes as early as Tokyo 2020 with the support of the Catalan Government`s 
General Secretary of Sport (Secreteria General de l’Esport), and launched the campaign 
Sport for Yes (l`Esport pel Sí). The COC was supported by 56 Catalan sport federations, 
which means 80% of all federations in the region favoured independence. They are 
coordinated by the Union of Catalan Sport Federations (Unió de Federacions Esportives de 
Catalunya). Simultaneously, the Catalan Sports Platform Proseleccions works toward the 
recognition of Catalan national teams. Catalonia can delegate a team if Spain chooses not to 
in a given sport, which is how the region has 21 national teams in peripheral sports.  
According to the Platform, ‘the fastest way to achieve that Catalonia may officially 
compete in all sports is independence’ (Públic 2017). Unsurprisingly, they argue that few 
sectors would gain so much with independence, and few are so ready to leave as sport. While 
there is substantial insecurity about the economic future of Catalonia after potential 
independence, actors in sport speak with remarkable self-confidence, which may be rooted in 
a few significant sport achievements: to a lesser degree the successes of the Sanchez-Casal 
high performance tennis academy, and to a greater extent  the 1992 Barcelona Olympic 
Games, Catalan football. These successes turn Barcelona into a symbolic equal, and 
sometimes even superior, to Madrid (see Hargreaves 2000, Vaczi 2015), for example when 
Madrid lost the 2020 Olympic bid in the final round in 2012. The Sanchez-Casal Tennis 
Academy gained international fame as the Spanish Armada of tennis players, while a great 
number of those players are Catalan.  Centralists like to present doomsday scenarios where 
FC Barcelona plays against third division teams in a ‘Catalan league,’ but the riposte is quick 
and confident. ‘Any major national league would be happy to have us,’ former FC Barcelona 
president Joan Laporta told us with an air of superiority. ‘The French, the English, the 
 21 
German, we have plenty to choose from with the moneys we would bring. But believe me,’ 
he winked, visibly enjoying the double bind of the Other, ‘The Spanish league will be the 
first one to want Barça to stay. They need us.’ This confidence, however, fails to consider 
that FC Barcelona too owes just as much to its arch-rivalry with Madrid, and that the Spanish 
national team offers attractive prospects to Catalan players. A Catalan national team would 
have had much less chance winning a World Cup and two Euro Cups, even if Catalans 
dominated the Spanish national team’s roster and play style. 
With Catalan Government subsidies, the Plataforma Proseleccions created a detailed 
study with the objective of identifying and quantifying the economic impact of potential 
independence on sport. The 2017 study was titled The Economic Impact of Catalonia`s 
Independence on Catalan Sport Federations, assessed the economic situation of Catalonia`s 
major federations and Olympic programs, and estimated the costs and benefits of secession 
(Plataforma 2017). According to it, sport`s gross value added GVA would grow by 7.4% in 
case of independence, and the sport sector`s weight in Catalan economy would increase from 
1.34% to 1.44%. Sport would bring in 2570 million euros, 176.2 million more than it does as 
part of Spain. The study argues that sport would dramatically increase Catalonia`s 
international visibility as athletes could compete in Catalan colours. Sport federations would 
also benefit from secession, the study argues. The only income football would lose is that 
coming from the Royal Spanish Football Federation (RFEF), which would be amply 
compensated by income generated in Catalonia through competitions, television rights, 
endorsements, betting and lotteries, sales, and Catalan government subsidies. It must be 
added that these are the findings of a pro-independence organization; in the absence of 
contrary studies, we may only wonder if these figures are not overly optimistic. 
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Sport, nationalism and the Scots 
Analysing anthems and an ‘anachronism’ 
It has long been argued that the historical anachronism which has resulted in the existence of 
independent Scottish sporting teams within international sport has acted as an additional 
signifier of Scotland’s nationhood, over and above the aforementioned independent civil 
institutions retained after the 1707 Act of Union which created the UK (Blain, Boyle, and 
O’Donnell, 1993; Jarvie and Walker, 1994). For example, competing on a regular basis with 
England in international sport, particularly football, undeniably enhanced a sense of Scotland 
as a place apart albeit within the United Kingdom. However, writing in 1991, James Kellas, 
himself a Scot, observed that ‘Scottish football supporters do not seek political independence 
for Scotland more than other Scots, as far as is known, nor do they give massive support to 
the Scottish National Party’ (Kellas, 1991: 21). The following year, Jim Sillars of the Scottish 
National Party complained that ‘Scotland has too many ninety minute patriots whose 
nationalist outpourings are expressed only at major sporting events’ (quoted in Jarvie and 
Walker, 1994: 1). However, to quote the words of the ‘anthem’ sung before Scottish 
international rugby union and football games, ‘those days are passed now and in the past they 
must remain’. Large numbers of Scottish football fans as well as fans of sport more generally 
clearly did vote for independence in the referendum of 2014. Whether this was true of 
Scottish sports people is harder to gauge. As we shall see, the better known athletes who 
voiced their opinion were more often than not supporters of the continuation of the union 
with one very notable exception. 
In contrast to Catalonia, therefore, it can be argued that Scottish national sporting 
teams have been most closely associated with notions of Scottish national identity, given that 
there is no such corollary to the status of FC Barcelona for any one club within Scottish club 
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football.  As has been discussed extensively elsewhere, the two largest football clubs in 
Scotland, Celtic and Rangers, have traditionally been associated, due to their association with 
Catholicism, republicanism and Irish nationalism (in the case of Celtic) or with Protestantism, 
loyalism and British unionism (in the case of Rangers) in past academic analyses (Bradley, 
2013; Flint and Kelly, 2013; Jarvie and Walker, 1994).  Therefore, the ethnoreligious and 
sociocultural affiliations of the two Glasgow clubs means that there is no specific football 
club around which pro-Scottish-independence identities could crystallise historically in the 
same way in which FC Barcelona have at times been framed, despite the fact that recent 
surveys of pro-independence support have demonstrated a rise in this regard amongst 
supporters of both clubs (Wings Over Scotland, 2014a, 2014b). 
Nonetheless, even if such sentiment cannot be simply conflated with political 
nationalism, the Scottish representative sporting teams afford an opportunity to maintain a 
sense of distinction for Scots within the Union.  In football, despite the diminishing status and 
performance of the Scottish national team which has failed to qualify for a major 
international tournament since the 1998 FIFA World Cup in France, the exploits of the 
‘Tartan Army’ of Scottish national team supporters have been argued to act as a conduit for 
the expression of Scottish identities, stereotypes and subcultural behaviours which are often 
deliberately juxtaposed against the fan cultures of the main national rivals, the ‘Auld Enemy’ 
of England (Bairner, 1994; Giulianotti, 1991).  Furthermore, even in the more socially 
conservative sport of rugby union, the symbolism of events such as the ‘Six Nations’ 
competition in which Scotland competes against England, Wales, a united Ireland team, 
France and Italy offers a similar platform for the performance of Scottish distinctiveness, 
with the relatively recent decision in the 1990s to use the unofficial Scottish national anthem 
of ‘Flower of Scotland’ rather than the official British national anthem of ‘God Save The 
Queen’ argued to represent a barometer of growing Scottish cultural nationalism (Jarvie, 
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2017; Jarvie and Reid, 1999; Jarvie and Walker, 1994).  However, the decision may have also 
been pragmatic in nature due to concerns about potential replication of the booing of ‘God 
Save The Queen’ which had been evident at Scottish international football matches (Jarvie 
and Reid, 1999) and the whistling by Catalan and Basque fans at Copa del Rey finals. 
 
Sporting personalities and the Scottish ‘indyref’ 
Despite the lack of clear correlation between sporting nationalism and cultural nationalism 
for Scots, this did not necessarily mean that sport was ignored within the lengthy and (mostly) 
healthy public debate during the period of the ‘indyref’, the moniker adopted by many for the 
2014 Scottish independence referendum.  In contrast to the arguments outlined above by 
Claudia Dasca regarding the support of Catalan sportspeople for independence, however, the 
Scottish context was predominantly characterised by political neutrality from Scottish 
sportspeople and teams on the matter, with the exception of a few notable interventions on 
both sides of the constitutional debate. 
Support for Scottish independence from within in the sporting world was particularly 
subdued throughout the majority of the campaign, except for the pro-independence ‘Yes 
Scotland’ campaign’s attempts to create a ‘Sport for Yes’ campaign group which was only 
able to recruit relatively low-profile sporting personalities such as Michael Stewart (football), 
Alex Arthur (boxing), Connie Ramsay (judo) and Samera Ashraf (kickboxing and karate).  
However, the last-minute intervention of Scottish tennis star Andy Murray on the morning of 
the referendum marked a significant moment in terms of the connection between sport and 
the pro-independence campaign: 
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Huge day for Scotland today! no campaign negativity last few days totally swayed 
my view on it.  excited to see the outcome.  lets do this! 
(https://twitter.com/andy_murray; 18th September 2014) 
Andy Murray has won three Grand Slam titles (US Open in 2012 and Wimbledon in 2013 
and 2016). He also won gold medals in the Olympic Games men’s singles competition in 
2012, when also won the mixed doubles silver medal with Laura Robson, and again in 
2016.  In 2015, he inspired Great Britain to victory in the Davis Cup. In total, he has 
played in nine Grand Slam finals and would almost certainly have won more titles had he 
not been competing in the same era as three of the greatest ever players – Roger Federer, 
Novak Djokovic and Rafael Nadal. 
At least as significant, however, in the eyes of many Scots has been his attitude 
towards England. In anticipation of the 2006 FIFA World Cup Finals and in response to 
teasing that Scotland had failed to qualify, Murray joked that he would ‘support whoever 
England were playing against’ (Independent, 2012).  He later expressed his regrets about 
this comment, admitting that it had cost him the support of some English fans 
(Independent, 2012). The abuse which he received was to be repeated after he tweeted on 
the morning of the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence. Murray subsequently 
admitted that it had not been in character to have acted in this way but he added that he 
had no regrets about declaring his support for independence (Guardian, 2014). 
None of this is to suggest that Murray can be compared with overtly nationalist 
sports stars from other small nations such as Dražen Petrović, a basketball player and the 
national team captain who was the most popular athlete of Yugoslavia in the 1980s – but 
who practically immediately after the break-up of Yugoslavia became ‘a Croatian 
national sports icon’ (Hrstić and Mustapić, 2015: 153). Nevertheless, as a consequence of 
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his views and of his demeanour, he has been identified by many in England as someone 
who is quintessentially Scottish – both dour and anti-English. The reality is, however, 
that he exists in that liminal space between Scottishness and Britishness along with so 
many of his compatriots. 
The tendency of many English people to conflate Englishness and Britishness 
may help to explain why Murray’s Britishness is often ignored. Not only has he 
represented Team GB in the Olympics, an arena from which many sport celebrities have 
emerged (Jackson and Andrews, 2012) but, in 2016 in Rio, he led the British team into 
the stadium at the Opening Ceremony, carrying the Union Flag. Moreover, in addition to 
inspiring the British team to victory in 2015 the Davis Cup. Murray also accepted the 
Order of the British Empire in 2013 and a knighthood awarded in the 2017 New Year’s 
Honours List. So how can a supporter of Scottish independence also accept that he is 
British? The answer lies in specific application of the concept of the ‘Caledonian 
antisyzygy’ which has exercised the minds of Scots for many generations, in this case the 
yoking together of Britishness and Scottishness which in recent years has brought many 
Scots, including Murray, to that place ‘whaur extremes meet’. 
The dualistic expression of Britishness and Scottishness in the domain of sport 
was harnessed more effectively by the pro-union ‘Better Together’ campaign, who were 
was able to recruit a much wider range of high-profile personalities from the two most 
popular sports in Scotland, football and rugby (Harris and Skillen, 2016; Jarvie, 2017; 
Whigham and May, 2017).  Furthermore, the pro-union campaign also received vocal 
support from Lynsey Sharp, a 800m runner who had represented both Scotland and Great 
Britain in athletics in events such as the Commonwealth Games and the Olympic Games, 
with Sharp giving media interviews outlining her support for the constitutional status quo 
as well as using Twitter in the same way as Andy Murray to pronounce her pro-union 
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support.  However, given Sharp’s lesser profile in comparison to Murray’s global status, 
and the fact that the vast majority of other pro-union sporting advocates highlighted 
above were retired footballer or rugby players, it can be surmised that the pro-union 
campaign may have been much more successful in terms of the ‘quantity’ of sporting 
endorsements but the pro-independence campaign were undoubtedly the victors in terms 
of ‘quality’ in terms of profile through Murray’s last-minute endorsement.  Regardless, 
the extent to which these interventions bore any impact on the final outcome of the 
referendum is highly questionable, at best (Jarvie, 2017; Whigham, 2017). 
 
Sport for Yes: Playing for (only) Scotland 
The pursuit of sporting endorsements by both of the official Scottish referendum 
campaign groups (despite reservations about their importance) was complemented by a 
degree of political leveraging of sport as a policy area within the official constitutional 
proposals by the SNP-led Scottish Government in their White Paper for Scottish 
independence (Scottish Government, 2013).  In particular, the proposals for sport as a 
policy area within the White Paper drew upon the findings of the ‘Working Group on 
Scottish Sport’, a group of sportspeople, sports administrators, academics, civil servants 
and politicians commissioned by the SNP-led Scottish Government to examine the 
potential impact of independence on Scottish sport (Scottish Government, 2014).  
Unsurprisingly, this group appeared be tasked with placing a particular emphasis on 
showing the benefits of independence in line with the SNP’s broader push to secure a 
‘Yes’ vote in the referendum, whilst also identifying simple solutions to any potential 
barriers for Scottish participation in international sporting competitions (Jarvie, 2017; 
Whigham and May, 2017).  In this sense, the Scottish Government’s approach to sport 
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was analogous to the broader ‘Yes’ campaign: emphasise the positives, and ignore or 
refute the negatives. 
The aforementioned Scottish ‘democratic deficit’ was central to the framing of the 
Working Group’s arguments: Scottish sport was argued to be constrained by the 
constitutional status quo, resulting in the lack of independent Scottish representation in 
the Olympics, Paralympics and the UK’s sporting governance, in turn causing declining 
levels of sports participation in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2014). Despite the lack 
of robust evidence to substantiate the afore-mentioned claims, Scottish independence was 
posited as the ‘magic bullet’ to end Scotland’s sporting woes, particularly within the 
Scottish Government’s White Paper: 
Independence will mean that more Scottish sportswomen and sportsmen will have 
the opportunity to compete at the highest level of international competition. It will 
also mean that the key decisions on athlete development will be taken in Scotland 
with the needs of the athlete at the centre. This will help many more of our sports-
people reach their full potential (Scottish Government, 2013: 179). 
 
Within sport, both neutral observers and pro-union campaigners highlighted this 
somewhat obstinate approach from the ‘Yes’ campaign with regards to legitimate points 
of contention in their proposals.  Firstly, given that sport policy is already devolved to the 
Scottish Government, the validity of their arguments regarding the specific need for 
Scottish independence as a means to achieve the goals of the Working Group was 
debatable. Secondly, when concerns were raised by ostensibly neutral sporting 
personalities such as Chris Hoy, a retired track cyclist and Scotland’s most successful 
Olympian, regarding the potential impact of the loss of access to UK-wide funding, 
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sporting facilities, and training programmes, these were held as evident of tacit support 
for a ‘No’ vote from Hoy by pro-independence campaigners, ignoring Hoy’s deliberate 
silence on his constitutional position (BBC, 2013). 
Regardless of the validity of these assumptions about Hoy’s voting intentions, the 
tendency of pro-independence campaigners to frame anyone who highlighted potential 
logistical barriers following Scottish independence as a dour ‘No’ voter was undoubtedly 
a polarising phenomenon with the referendum debate.  Whilst those who placed their 
head above the parapet to raise similar concerns or to explicitly state their support for a 
‘No’ vote, such as the afore-mentioned case of Lynsey Sharp, could undoubtedly expect 
to become embroiled in such debates, the negative framing of commentators who were 
attempted to remain politically neutral was unlikely to be an effective method of 
addressing the concerns of the important floating ‘Don’t Know’ voters during the 
campaign. 
Finally, the White Paper’s contentions that ‘more Scottish sportswomen and 
sportsmen will have the opportunity to compete at the highest level of international 
competition’ (Scottish Government, 2013: 179) also highlights the centrality of a 
symbolic conundrum for some Scottish athletes: their dual representation of Scottishness 
and Britishness.  This conundrum has become embroiled in past political debates on the 
symbolism of Scottish sporting successes, with ex-First Minister and SNP leader Alex 
Salmond’s attempts to distinguish the success of Scottish athletes of those of 
‘Scolympians’ rather than members of ‘Team GB’ receiving wide criticism (Harris and 
Skillen, 2016; Jarvie, 2017).  In many ways, the dualistic symbolism for Scottish athletes 
who may represent Scotland at events such as the Commonwealth Games whilst also 
representing the UK at the Olympics can be argued to create a dilemma for these athletes 
in terms of their symbolic positioning and personal feelings on national identity.  Indeed, 
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this can be held to be a sporting example of the aforementioned ‘Caledonian Antisyzgy’ 
in action at this intersection between sport and politics, as sportspeople are torn between 
arguments of the ‘head’ for their sporting success and the ‘heart’ in terms of their 
personal political position. 
 
Conclusion 
Scotland and Catalonia are in a liminal state of transformation. It is often said that Scotland is 
only one generation and an effective Brexit away from another, this time successful ‘indyref,’ 
and Catalonia has been in a constant state of turmoil since the illegalization of their 2017 
independence referendum. The suspension of Catalonia`s autonomy, police violence at voting 
stations, the imprisonment and exile of the rank and file of Catalan politics is pushing 
formerly neutral citizens toward independence, while social divisions are palpable. Catalans 
are looking to Scotland as a much-awaited precedence of secession in a European Union that 
has practically no directives as to the fate of new states. For obvious reasons, many Scottish 
scholars and political activists became increasingly interested in Catalonia during the first 
decade of the twentieth-first century, prompting McInnes (2004: 135) to issue the warning 
that ‘Catalonia is not Scotland’. Writing in 2010, Marti-Tomas (2010: 32) argued that 
‘national identity has different meanings and representations in Scotland and Catalonia. It has 
a cultural sense in Scotland, while it is more political in Catalonia’. Even if this was true 
when it was written, which is highly debatable, the claim that national identity in Scotland is 
somehow less than political is surely absurd. Indeed, it is the cultural element that has all but 
disappeared from separatist rhetoric in Scotland while cultural distinctiveness remains a 
powerful accompaniment to political demands in Catalonia. 
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 Because of the loyalties it requires in a field of antagonistic competition, sport is 
uniquely positioned to show the broader dilemmas of secessionist subjectivities. 
Considering the ambiguities and transitoriness of secessionism, it might be revealing to 
approach secessionist contexts as a liminal field where extremes meet and interact within 
the same matrix of ritual transformation. Turner illustrates such fields with the transition 
of ‘boy’ to ‘man:’ While becoming transformed and commencing to play the various 
adult male roles, ‘he may retain… the boyish roles of son and brother towards those to 
whom he originally related in those roles’ (Turner 1977: 56). This transition is only 
thinkable in a liminal field that goes beyond binary oppositions: one that condenses 
‘components of two different states of the same matrix related by transformation’ (Turner 
1977: 56). Our examples show that secessionism is a similarly liminal field of 
transformation as it includes what is seen as mutually exclusive sets of relationships 
(Catalans vs. Spaniards; Scottish vs. British, secessionists vs. unionists/centralists), which 
at the same time allows subjects to pass from one state to another and occupy them non-
exclusively. FC Barcelona player Piqué perfectly embodies this liminal persona with the 
(apparent) ease with which he transitions back and forth between pro-independence 
Catalanist rallies and the Spanish national team locker room. 
Positioning oneself in this secessionist matrix might cause existential questions, 
but it is also the same field that offers some solutions. In 1994, in a private conversation 
with one of the authors who had complained of the dilemma of balancing dual national 
identities, the English political scientist Bernard Crick suggested that this dilemma also 
provides Scots, such as the author, with great opportunities to be British when they want 
to be and Scottish when it suits. He felt that, as an Englishman, he was missing out. Life 
in the UK has undeniably offered Scots a chance to blame the misfortunes and failures 
that happened on the English and not on themselves. With increasingly devolved powers 
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in the hands of the Scottish government, of course, that situation has begun to change, 
and it remains to be seen what happens when there will be no extremes to meet, and Scots 
too will be ‘missing out’. 
Through our examination of the relationship between sport and secessionist 
politics in Scotland and Catalonia, we have revealed striking differences between the two 
nations as well as important similarities. Each is at a pivotal point in its history. Sport will 
continue to play a role in debates about their political futures. What remains to be seen is 
whether the extremes will be reconciled or allowed to persist, thereby leaving the peoples 
of the two nations to continue to wrestle with existential crises brought on by living 
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